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Sunday, 14 March 2010

An explanation of Kant's moral argument

Kant’s moral argument focuses on the notion that God must exist to provide structure to the moral universe. Technically he did not believe that is was possible to prove the existence of God through rational or empirical means. It is important to outline two key ideas before explaining the details of the moral argument. These ideas centre around his assumptions of the universe: that the universe was fair; and that the world around us is fundamentally rational. He begins with the unspoken assumption that the world is fair, owing to the dominance of the enlightenment belief that the universe was fundamentally knowable through reason. It is important to note that Kant began a new way of looking at knowledge. He believed that we could know the world through reason in a prior synthetic way. This was a complete change from how the world had been view previously and was known as Kant’s Copernican revolution. In essence Kant believed in two separate worlds of knowledge: noumenal and the phenomenal worlds. The noumenal world is the world as it truly is without being observed. It is fundamentally unknowable because the act of observation changes the very thing that we observe. It is as though human beings have a specific set of spectacles that cannot be taken off and like the proverbial rose tinted ones they change our perception of the world around us. This personalised view of the universe is the phenomenal world. However, what is key to explaining Kant’s moral argument is the fact that reason is the tool that can be used to know the true nature of the universe as it does not and cannot change.

Kant’s moral argument focuses on reason, good will, duty and the notion that we ought to strive towards moral perfection. It begins with the claim of two things that have him in awe: the starry heavens above; and the moral law within. This moral law for Kant was universal and objective. An example of this might be seen in the wide scale agreement that murder or torture is wrong. There seems to be agreement across cultures that certain actions are intrinsically wrong. This, for Kant, suggests that there is a universal objective moral law. He believed that the highest form of goodness was the notion of good will, namely that someone would freely choose to do good for no reward whatsoever, only for the sake of goodness. Moreover, Kant believed that we have a moral duty to do such good things. He would argue that we have an awareness of what is right and wrong and that good will should make us act accordingly as reason dictates this to be the case. In a way it doesn’t make any rational sense to act in an immoral way. If I were to act out of nepotism (favouritism) or from emotion then I could never discern the universal objective moral law as these factors would cause me to change my opinion of what was right or wrong depending on how I was feeling or what the circumstances happened to be. So I must choose the good based on good will and reason. Duty was seen by Kant as a way of fulfilling this end without being misguided by emotion or factors of personal gain. It is here that we come to a key point in Kant’s argument, namely the notion of ‘ought’ implies ‘can’. He believed that we can only have a duty to do some thing that we can do. For example, I cannot have a duty to fly unaided as it is not something that I can do; or if I were to come across someone drowning in a lake but could not swim Kant would suggest that I would not have a duty to jump in and save them. My duty in the latter case would be to find someone who could swim so I would need to raise the alarm. Once we have this notion of ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ in our mind the argument becomes much clearer. If I can choose to do the good (using reason, good will and duty) in one case then I should be able to do this in every case, moreover that I have a duty to achieve this moral perfection. Kant called this moral perfection the Summum Bonum. He argued that the Summum Bonum was a state of moral perfection existing coincidently with perfect happiness. It is important to note, as stated earlier, that Kant did not believe that acting out of self interest (in this case achieving perfect happiness) would ever bring us to the correct moral decision. If my aim in life were to achieve perfect happiness then this would not cause me to act morally. For Kant, the problem for human beings acting morally was that it did not lead to happiness. I could be the most moral person in the world yet personal tragedy could befall me, while another individual may lead an immoral life and be happy in some way. This would appear to make the world unfair and would potentially discourage us from acting morally at all. Kant believed that we must have a duty to achieve the Summum Bonum and because it was not achievable in this lifetime that we must be able to achieve this in the next life.

It is here that we come to the conclusion of Kant’s moral argument. Notice that Kant does not see this as ‘proof’ of God’s existence only that in order for moral behaviour of human beings to make sense we must postulate three things. These are known as the three postulates of practical reason: free will, immortality of the soul and God. Kant believed that if we were not free to make moral decisions then we could not achieve a state of moral perfection because we would not be morally blameworthy or praiseworthy for our actions. He also argued for the immortality of the soul as we have seen above; behaving morally in this life defies reason if we cannot achieve the Summum Bonum in this life, as others who act immorally appear happy as opposed to those who behave morally, not to mention the fact that we may die before this state of moral perfection is reached. The afterlife is therefore necessary to provide the opportunity to achieve the obligation of moral perfection and perfection happiness that reason dictates. The final part of the conclusion of Kant’s moral argument is that God must exist as a postulate of practical reason. Without the existence of God we cannot have the afterlife and we would not be able to fulfil our obligation of reaching the Summum Bonum. Therefore God is necessary to ensure fairness in the universe and provide the exact coincidence of moral perfection and perfect happiness known as the Summum Bonum.

‘Kant’s moral argument cannot be defended.’ Discuss.

The claim that Kant’s moral argument cannot be defended is questionable. Freud is someone who would agree with this claim. For Freud our moral awareness comes through a clash between our subconscious desires, instincts or wants (known as the id) and societal and cultural pressures on the conscious mind (or ego). If this were demonstrated to be the case then Kant’s claim of an objective moral law within every human being would be incorrect. Without this objective moral law then Kant would not require God to ensure fairness in the universe. Freud claims that our guilty conscience is formed from the pressure of societal expectation on the mind but he makes these claims based on a very narrow evidence base. It would seem hasty to accept Freud’s claims that morality comes from a psychological phenomena if he has only used five case studies to reach his conclusion. Also Freud has been challenged by others in his field who claim that his methods were unscientific. It would be difficult to hold that Freud was correct in his claims about morality if this is the case and by implication this would mean that this attack would not be strong enough to establish another source of moral understanding. However, Richard Dawkins might also attack Kant’s argument along a similar theme, namely that morality comes from a source other than God. Like Freud, if Dawkins could prove that morality comes from a source other than God then Kant’s moral argument would potentially be indefensible. Dawkins would argue that morality has not come from God but has developed as a part of evolution. Morality for Dawkins fulfils certain functions within society. It keeps human society stable which is beneficial for all human beings. Dawkins has argued that if we existed in a society without morals that this would not be of any use for our species; if we lived in a society where murder was the norm of behaviour we would have quickly died out as a species. However, this notion could be challenged on the grounds that Dawkins makes the assertion that this morality comes from human beings alone. Is it not possible that there has been a divine hand at work which has implanted moral behaviour within human beings? If this were the case then Dawkins’ claim that morality comes from a source other than God could not be defended and the criticism would cease to be effective against the moral argument.

Perhaps the argument itself could be attacked more directly. David Hume would have challenged the notion that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ by stating that we cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. This is known as the ‘is’-‘ought’ fallacy. He claimed that we cannot move from a descriptive statement about the universe, such as ‘there is a bookcase in my living room’, to a prescriptive or normative claim, that said bookcase has any moral status. Hume would therefore challenge the notion of ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ that is integral to Kant’s moral argument by stating that it is a leap of logic to move from a descriptive statement to a moral statement. Hume believed that morality was nothing more than an emotional response from the individual observing the world around them. If this were the case then Kant’s argument would fail in two ways: firstly the logic of the argument would break down, so much so that we would no longer have an obligation to achieve the Summum Bonum as ‘ought’ does not imply ‘can’; secondly the source of human morality would be derived from emotional responses to environmental stimuli. In essence for humans there is no universal objective moral law within us. The second claim could be dealt with in much the same way as the Dawkins claim was dismissed. Emotivism assumes a non-cognitivist approach to morality (meaning that moral claims are not statements of facts about the universe). It would be difficult to uphold the claim that Hume makes about moral statements being nothing more than personal expressions of like or dislike against Kant’s view that we can make factual statements about morality in the universe, as neither one can be proved conclusively. However the first claim that we cannot move logically from the observation of the physical world around us to a moral claim (found in the ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ part of the Kant’s argument) seems to be logically sound. Moreover, Kant assumes that the universe is fair in his logical process. This claim could also be challenged as it does not necessarily follow that this is the case because I claim it to be so. Evidence seems to suggest that the universe is not fair. Rich, powerful and selfish people appear to prosper at the expense of the poor and helpless in our society. These deep seated social injustices continue with monetary gains appearing to be the main motive and not moral obligations to the weak and needy. It seems credible that Kant’s enlightenment view of the universe caused him to believe that the universe was fundamentally knowable through human reason thereby causing him to hold the unfounded belief that the universe was fair. This claim seems weak in the face of evidence or reason and so it would seem that this part of the argument must also be questioned.

In conclusion the claim that morality could come from a source other than God is inconclusive as other evidence could be drawn to support this notion (the appearance of objective morals across cultures for example), but that part of the reasoning processes within the argument could be challenged by David Hume (is-ought fallacy) and the assumption that the universe is fair without any evidence to back this claim up. Although the latter point here could be more challengeable because Kant would argue that it is precisely because of this reason that we must postulate the existence of the afterlife and God. However, it does appear as though the Kant’s moral argument cannot be defended because the logical steps of the argument can be effectively challenged by David Hume’s ‘is’-‘ought’ problem.

“The personal experience of God by any individual is proof enough that ‘He’ exists.” Discuss

The above statement focuses on the notion that it is possible to prove the existence of God through personal religious experience. This raises a number of key philosophical questions that need further investigation if we are to conclude that personal experience by anyone could demonstrate God’s existence: firstly there is the issue of whether the testimony of any individual could count as evidence enough for God’s existence; secondly the issue of the validity of religious experience in general needs to be addressed as simply believing something to be the case does not necessarily ensure its certainty; and finally (although not exhaustively but for reasons of time restraints) the notion of whether perception in general could demonstrate objectively (and potentially conclusively) the existence of a divine being capable of having a personal relationship with ‘His’ creation. We shall begin by addressing the issue of testimony of individuals claiming to have private religious experiences.

Claiming that you ‘know’ God poses serious problems for the issue of testimony. How can we know that an individual has really experienced what they say they have? Both William James (the 20th C. American psychologist) and Richard Swinburne place importance in the notion of testimony as being evidence for private religious experience and by implication the existence of God. James was particularly keen to highlight that we should approach the testimony of individuals claiming to have experienced the divine with an open mind so as not to miss out on a potential truth of the universe. He was a pragmatist in his dealings with religious experience and outlines his methodology clearly, at the beginning of his ‘The varieties of Religious Experience’. This meant that he approached the testimonies that he recorded with an objective and scientific mindset. Moreover for these experiences to be valid for him they need only have real effects for the individual who experienced the event. For example: Imagine a builder who was selfish and frugal having a vision of Jesus. This individual was so moved by the incredible amounts of love and compassion from this experience that they give up their job and move to Africa, volunteering their skills to help build homes, wells and schools in deprived areas. This for James would be evidence enough that the experience was valid. However, even though James stresses the importance of these testimonies it is difficult to see whether what the individual has reported bares any relationship to factual existence of a divine being. This ‘real effect’ as James sees it could have come about without there being any objective experience of God. The subjective nature of personal religious experience leaves us with little concrete evidence that this could be used as evidence for the existence of God. As we shall see later, Freud would argue that these experiences are nothing but illusions manifesting themselves as the neurosis of a faulty mind.

For now though, Richard Swinburne would back up the notion that testimony itself should count as some form of evidence for the existence of God as it is a standard of proof. The belief that: ‘for something to only be considered valid if it can be proven through scientific means’ is flawed according to Swinburne. Swinburne argues through his principle of Testimony that we should consider the reported experiences of others seriously and not simply dismiss these out of hand because they do not conform neatly to the empirical ideals expected for scientific proof. After all if we are to observe the world around us and only claim that those things which can be proven conclusively (or beyond scientific doubt) exist then we could be missing important truths about the world. This belief (which C.S Lewis refers to as ‘Naturalism’) also assumes that the scientific method is the correct one. For Swinburne we should seriously consider the evidence (although not hard scientific data which would be preferable) of testimony seriously.
It seems unlikely that Swinburne, or James for that matter, would suggest that we simply accept the experience of ‘any individual’ as proof enough that God exists, as he is more convinced by the cumulative nature of the experiential argument. Both Swinburne and James see the sheer weight of testimony as important and not, therefore, that we should simply accept that God exists because one individual believes they have experienced this. Yet, as alluded to earlier, Freud would take issue with the notion of this view of the testimony of religious believers as outlined above from Swinburne and James. Freud believed that religion was nothing more than a universal obsessional neurosis that was the product of a faulty mind. This obsession manifests itself in neurosis which was a physical symptom of the sick mind (an example of a neurosis might be returning to the kitchen several times to check that you have turned the gas off on the hob – even though you had done this the first time). The notion of accepting the testimony of the religious believer claiming to have had personal experience of God was, Freud believed, ill advised because these individuals were deluded. Dawkins also agrees with Freud on this point. He suggests that if you had the delusion that you were Napoleon Bonaparte you would be very lonely in this delusion but the fact that as many as one billion (in the Catholics’ case) people share the same beliefs as you would, Dawkins claims, strengthen your resolve that your delusion was correct. The fact remains that in the case of private religious experiences both Freud and Dawkins would claim that the individual is nothing more than deluded. If you knew that an individual were deluded would you accept their opinion on a matter as great as the existence of God? Both Freud and Dawkins would argue ‘No’. If these two thinkers are correct then they certainly would not accept the claim that we should believe that the personal experience of any individual should be proof enough that God exists. However, both Freud and Dawkins have come under criticism for being unduly negative when it comes to their dealings with all things religious. It is hard to see how their heartfelt conviction, (and no doubt subsequent testimony) that the religious believer is mistaken in their deluded belief surrounding their religious experience, is any different from their own in terms of weight of testimony. After all, this assumes that Dawkins and Freud are correct in their assertion that religious believers are deluded. It does not necessarily follow that this is the case. It is here that we arrive at another very important impasse for our debate on the notion of personal experience being evidence for the existence of God, namely: the discussion of how we could ascertain that these experiences were valid.

Freud and Dawkins would have us believe that individuals who claim to have experienced God are deluded. But how could we know if they were or not? The very nature of private experience is just that, that it is private. My knowledge of the world around me is my knowledge. For example: the smell of my Sunday lunch is a subjective experience. You cannot know what it is that I experience. James believed that this was an important quality of mystical experience. He described this as a ‘noetic’ quality. This he believed was common to most mystical experience as many of the people that he interviewed claimed to have gained some deep truth of the universe through their experience that they could not be explained in human language because of the ineffable nature of mystical experiences (another of James’ observations about mystical experience). This ‘revelation’ could not be achieved through either empirical or rational means. James claims that only another individual who has experienced something similar would know what an individual had experienced during their mystical experience. The question must then be asked: how can we be sure that they have experienced this at all. Antony Flew would claim that there is no way of falsifying the believer’s claim to this knowledge and so it must be dismissed as meaningless. In other words there is no way of knowing whether the claimed experience is valid. If we cannot know whether it is valid it would seem a little hasty to claim that it is proof enough that God exists. Consider the following statement: ‘I believe that the golf course will be open next weekend’. Without an accurate weather forecast to back up this claim I may be optimistic in holding this belief (owing to the torrents of rain that have fallen in recent days). This leads us to the conclusion that we must have our own first-hand experience to be really sure that something is the case. Taking another’s experience seems to go against the Socratic notion of never being satisfied with second hand truths. Yet Swinburne would argue that we should accept what people report through his ‘Principle of Credulity’. He believes that people tend not to lie and so should accept what they tell us at face value. There are a number of problems with this view. Both Mackie and Starbuck would question this view on the same point. Starbuck believed that something could be a psychic reality for you but that this belief did not translate into reality. Mackie also claims that people can be mistaken in their beliefs. It seems as though even the most well meaning of religious individuals, excluding those who might (as Hume suggested) purposely miss report their claims out of some misguided notion, reporting their experience and more importantly believing it 100% to be the case could be wrong. We are still left with the serious question as to whether even the individual can ‘know’ that their experience is the case. It is a custom in essays on religious experience to trot out examples of people who have experiences under the influence of drugs and alcohol (which Freud believes adds weight to his faulty mind argument) to attack the very foundations of these experiences, yet these are weak arguments as they do not represent the majority of experiences reported. There is potentially one more final nail in the coffin of the valid religious experience which comes in the guise of the ‘God helmet’. Michael Persinger, a neuro-scientist has devised a helmet that produces a weak magnetic pulse that causes the wearer of said helmet to report feeling the presence of the divine in the room with them while they wear it. In other words the helmet causes the wearer to ‘experience’ God. It would appear that if this is the case the whole notion of the validity of religious experience and the subsequent reporting of this experience to others could be challenged on the basis of it being simply the product of the human brain. This conclusion is perhaps not as sound as initially thought. It assumes that the origins of these ‘experiences’ are found in the mind. Perhaps these induced experiences are no different from other ‘experiences’ that people have reported, the native American Indians have been using hallucinogenic plants to experience mystical experiences for centuries. James dismissed the claim that we should not accept the validity of induced experiences based on the idea that it does not necessarily disprove the validity of such experiences. It is here that we reach our final point – religious experiences will come down to the perception of the individual.

The notion of religious experience being evidence of the existence of God can be explained in two ways. The experience could be subjective but still having ‘real effects’ as James suggests, or it could be an objective experience of the universe around us providing critical insight into the divine being. Critics of the latter, such as Hume, may well argue that the sheer number of different cultures reporting religious experiences would question the validity of this objective experience. Yet this might not be the case if we were to subscribe to a pluralistic understanding of religion: the idea, as put forward by John Hick, that there is only one divine being and that the details of religious faith and practice are nothing more than a cultural expression of this divine being. This view would suggest that seemingly conflicting testimonies of Muslim, Hindu or Christian believers are nothing more than cultural experiences of the same divine being. Thereby giving weight to the notion that we can accept these as valid proofs of the existence of God. A more important issue needs to be raised as an offering for a conclusion to this work. This also comes from the thinking of John Hick. The criticisms raised by the work of neuro-scientists and the ‘God helmet’, as well as drug or alcohol induced experiences, point to an interesting notion that should not be missed. John Hick describes this idea as ‘experiencing as’ which he develops from Wittgenstein’s ‘seeing as’. Hick has suggested that the whole issue of religious experience comes down to perception of the world around us. In some sense Freud and Dawkins will never see religious experiences as valid proof for the existence of God because they are not looking for such answers as their minds are closed off to the whole experience. While others like Otto, James and Swinburne are more likely to experience the world around them in a religious manner because they are open to the possibility of this. People experience the same events in different ways according to Hick – a sunset might be interpreted as a beautiful event with divine significance for one person whilst being the onset of the inconvenience of darkness for another. Ultimately we cannot be sure that the testimony that an individual gives us will be conclusive of the existence of God in any objective way or that these experiences are indeed valid, but what does seem clear is that to dismiss these ideas out of hand would be unwise because we cannot be sure whether we are experiencing the world as it really is.

Monday, 25 January 2010

'Aquinas' and Paley's teleological arguments cannot be defended' Discuss.

This is another sample question for the AS students. It links with the work that precedes it on the teleological argument. It was written in exam conditions with a 15 minute time limit.

To state that Aquinas’ and Paley’s argument cannot be defended appears a little hasty. For example thinkers such as Arthur Brown and Morowitz would suggest that these teleological arguments can be defended. Arthur Brown asks us to see the ozone layer and its ability to block out harmful UV rays yet not blocking out heat and light as evidence of design in much the same way that Paley or Aquinas might; that the order of the universe is such that one could only conclude that God created the universe. This is seen in Aquinas’ claim that the universe did not come about ‘fortuitously but designedly’ which suggests that there is intelligence behind the creation of order or regularity in the universe. So in some sense Arthur Brown backs up Aquinas’ view of order and regularity through design. However Arthur Brown was writing in the 1940s prior to the modern ozone crisis. Surely an omniscient creator would have known that the ozone layer would not stand up to human abuse through CFC usage? A challenge to this would be that God knew that humans would do this but left it up to us as to how we respond to this environmental problem. It seems as though some support could be lent to Aquinas at very least. Morowitz (a bio-chemist) suggests that the very complexity of the protein molecules that go towards making the building blocks of life means that there hasn’t been enough time for this life to come about any other way except design. He suggests that the chances of life coming about by chance were 1/10236. So Morowitz argues that God is needed as an anti-chance factor. This notion would lend support to Paley’s design qua purpose argument as it demonstrates intelligent design. However, even with odds this great David Hume could argue, through the epicurean hypothesis (that the universe could have ordered itself through chance given enough time), that just because the chances are high it does not mean that it is not chance that is responsible for shaping the perceived order and regularity in the universe. After all, we wouldn’t be here to notice this apparent design if the universe were not capable of supporting life at all, so even the slimmest of chances could still produce a universe such as ours.

However, one could attempt to use an evolutionary criticism of Aquinas and Paley. Darwin’s theory of natural selection through the process of random changes handed down to generations of offspring would support the idea that it is not design but chance that has caused the universe or at least life to evolve in the manner that we see. This would challenge the notion of the lacteal system in animals or the complexity of the eye that Paley would like us to believe. Paley and Aquinas see God in the creation of the universe while others like Darwin see blind random chance. This is a heavy blow to the arguments of Aquinas and Paley as they rely entirely upon demonstrating that it is not chance but design that has created order and regularity in the universe.

Mill could challenge both Aquinas’ and Paley’s arguments leaving them indefensible. His main critique is to challenge either the omnibenevolence or omnipotence of such a God who would create as cruel a world as this one. He believes that if any human were to commit such atrocities that are seen in nature on a day to day basis they would be placed in jail and condemned by civilised society. This critique would challenge the conclusion of both arguments suggesting that the designer is God. Yet it would appear that the creation is only as good as the creator. Neither Paley nor Aquinas would be happy to accept Mill’s conclusion. Yet they could draw support from Leibniz’s best of all possible world idea. Namely, that God has created a world with natural evil as part of God’s plan. We will only find out why God has allowed this after death.

In conclusion Paley’s and Aquinas’ arguments can be defended to a degree but the weight of Mill, Darwin and Hume lies heavy on the certainty of the conclusion of both of their arguments. It appears as though the argument for chance is more persuasive in this case.

Explain the teleological argument for the existence of God.

a) Explain the teleological argument for the existence of God. [25]

The teleological argument is one of five arguments for the existence of God. It attempts to prove God’s existence by using our experience of the world or universe around us. This makes it a posteriori in nature. Teleological arguments can essentially be broken down into two main types: pre-Darwinian and post Darwinian. We shall focus on pre-Darwinian as they are considered to be the more traditional of these arguments. Further subdivisions of the teleological arguments can be identified in the guise of ‘design qua regularity’ and ‘design qua purpose’. It is within these areas that we find the thinking of two main advocates of Aquinas (13th C) and Paley (19th C). We will continue by looking at each of these in turn.
The teleological or design argument gets its name from the Greek word telos which means end, goal or purpose. It is this end or purpose that both Aquinas and Paley are looking for that will suggest the existence of a divine creator. We will begin by outlining Aquinas’ fifth way ‘From the governance of things’ or design qua regularity argument (qua meaning through or pertaining to). Aquinas observed the universe and saw that everything in the universe appeared to be working in some sort of order. In particular he noticed that ‘natural bodies’ behaved in a regular way. Here Aquinas is talking about things like flowers or insects. However one could also use the example of a daffodil that flowers in spring time. He then goes on to notice the fact that these natural bodies ‘lack intelligence’. By this he means that they are not conscious of their own movement, yet even so they appear to move or act in regular fashion, as our daffodil flowers every spring time. Aquinas suggests that these things cannot provide their own movement as they lack the intelligence to do so. This must mean that their movement or regularity must come from somewhere other than themselves. He suggests that this movement does not occur ‘fortuitously but designedly’. By this he means that this regularity or movement has not come around by sheer chance but that something else has caused the flower or ‘natural bodies’ to obey an ordained pattern. Aquinas then goes on to suggest that ‘as an arrow is directed to its mark by the archer’ so too is the movement/regularity of things directed by a being with intelligence. The analogy of the arrow and the archer is used by Aquinas to demonstrate the link between God and creation. For Aquinas this intelligence that provides regularity of movement in the universe is God. This is the conclusion of Aquinas’ argument from design qua regularity. William Paley also has a design qua regularity argument but is most famous for his design qua purpose argument known as the analogy of the watch. It is this argument that we shall now focus our attention on, returning to Paley’s own design qua regularity argument at a later stage.

Paley’s design qua purpose argument has a different feel from Aquinas’ as he first focused on outlining a hypothetical situation and then drawing conclusions about the nature of existence from this hypothetical. This is the essence of any analogy. The analogy begins with Paley asking us to imagine crossing a heath (wasteland) and ‘pitching your foot against a stone’. If you were to pick up this stone that you have found he suggests that you would not immediately ask the question ‘where does this stone come from?’ as there would be nothing remarkable about it. However if you continued on the heath and pitched your foot against an old fashioned pocket watch you would not be able to dismiss the watch as you did the stone. Paley argues that this is because of the complexity of the watch. The cogs, wheels and counter weights in the mechanism, on closer inspection, would demonstrate this complexity. Moreover, if the pieces of the watch were placed in any other order, the watch wouldn’t work or it would not fulfil its purpose of telling the time. Yet the pocket watch fulfils the purpose of telling the time. Paley states that on discovery of this watch you would have to stipulate a watch maker or designer because of the complex nature of the mechanism and its obvious purpose for telling the time.
Using similar logic Paley continues his analogy by moving onto his observations of the universe or world around us. In particular Paley focuses on the human eye to demonstrate complexity and purpose. Paley observed that the human eye was made up of different complex components, the lens, iris and cornea etc, and that the coming together of these different parts could not have come about by sheer chance alone as the eye is too complex. He suggested that just as in the case of the watch with its clear complexity and purpose, we must conclude a designer of the eye because of its obvious purpose of seeing. If the eye were put together in a different manner either it wouldn’t see at all or would only provide partial sight, either case would see it falling short of its purpose. Paley also provides other examples of design qua purpose through the example of animal lacteal systems. His argument suggests that animals such as cows, horses and sheep have a small number of teats and paps because of their small number young, yet the sow, bitch and cat have many teats or paps because they have a large number in their litter. For Paley clear complexity and purpose of the eye, and something as straightforward as animals having the number of teats or paps that correspond to the number of young points to clear evidence of design in the world. This designer or provider of purpose in the universe is, for Paley, the God of Christianity. Yet Paley does not stop there, he continues onto a design qua regularity similar to that of Aquinas.

Paley’s design qua regularity argument comes on the back of some major changes in the way that the universe was understood. In 1687 Sir Isaac Newton formulated the laws of motion and gravity marking the movement into a ‘classical’ view of physics. The view of classical physics suggests that the universe is like a machine, working like clockwork in predictable patterns. It is this that Paley picks up on. Paley’s argument is an updated version of Aquinas’ in some respects, in the notion that objects cannot provide their own order. But there are some subtleties of Paley’s argument that need to be brought out. Paley suggests that the rotation or ellipses of planets are so regular as to provide the opportunity for life on earth. He focuses on gravity and suggests that without the continuity or regularity of gravity then we would have a very different universe. Theoretically it would be possible to have the laws of the universe in any state, but only within narrow boundaries would we find stability of ellipsis such as our planets. He argues that this regularity did not come about by chance but that it has been directed to be the case by some higher power. This being, for Paley, is God.

In conclusion we have looked over three of the more famous pre-Darwinian teleological arguments for the existence of God. Both Aquinas and Paley have argued that the universe has not come about into its present state of its own accord, but that the universe demonstrates clear evidence of an intelligent designer behind its existence.